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1. Introduction 
The myriad pressure of drivers as globalisation, international project teams, international 
client systems, demand for greater efficiencies is, in part, bringing about a shift towards 
through-life value. As the traditional organising method of design, bid, build, with a focus on 
price and competition offer little incentive for trust and cooperation to emerge (Cheung et al., 
2003), this method is proven to be unsuitable to deliver this through-life value in construction 
projects.  Implementing integrated through-life value teams, establishing relationships in 
which all project actors collaborate to connect business need, design, production, handover 
and use of a new facility, are increasingly encouraged worldwide. This trend is apparent in 
countries like the UK (Naoum, 2003), Japan (Chan et al., 2006) and Sweden (Eriksson et al., 
2008, 2009) where researchers reported on measureable successes.  
The move to integrated project teams being witnessed elsewhere is not taking place on the 
same scale in Belgium. Relative to other countries Belgium is not going down this ‘through 
life value’ path. Therefore the espoused benefits of integrated, collaborative working are not 
being experienced. Although there is clear evidence of growing dissatisfaction and 
inefficiencies in outcomes in the Belgian construction industry, construction participants as 
well in public and private sectors do not seem to put effort in looking for alternatives.  
Without this move towards proper integration of design, construction , financing, maintenance 
and operation functions (DBFM(O)), requiring a move to fully integrated project teams 
(IPTs), early supply team involvement (werken in ‘bouwteam’), continuous improvement of 
processes, joint commitment and sharing of risks, responsibilities and profits, best through-
life value will never be achieved. Adversarial relationships and disputes will continue to 
dominate the industry. No mutual trust and commitment will get established.  
Building long term relationships with clients will become the norm, with a change of focus 
towards value adding on a through-life cycle basis (Oostra, 2009). 
Although DBFM(O) teams seem to be a suitable alternative to traditional procurement in 
public construction projects, to achieve through-life value, its low level of adoption in 
Belgium should be questioned. Why are integrated project teams (IPTs) not generally 
prevalent?  
 
2. Barriers 
Based on several other researches, Eriksson et al. (2008, 2009) detected three types of barriers 
preventing the adoption of through life value in the construction industry. They are 
categorised in cultural barriers, organisational barriers and institutional or industrial barriers. 
 
Cultural aspects regarding people and their attitudes, like conservatism, inflexibility, low 
commitment, mistrust often constitute a vital barrier to change (Ng et al., 2002), as well as the 
adversarial culture in the construction sector (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) with parties trying 
to achieve individual objectives, rather than working together towards mutual objectives.  
The second group of barriers involve organisational aspects. The traditional organisation of 
construction projects in which distinct packages are allocated individually to different 
specialists together with the public client’s competitive tendering habits, hampers the 
integration of work tasks and actors (Briscoe et al., 2004). These factors are even strengthened 
through legislation (see next paragraph). Ng et al. (2002) report that relationships become 
strained if actors have low confidence in each others’ competences. Every party involved 
need to develop new competences to participate in integrated projects (Eriksson et al., 2008). 
Exchanging competences among participants in collaborative relationships can be achieved 
through early contractor procurement, forward integration in the supply chain.  
Competitive pressures,  and government regulations are examples of the third group, the 
institutional or industrial barriers that are derived from the organisation’s industrial 
environment, potentially serving as serious barriers to change in general (Eriksson et al. 2008, 
2009). Through establishing legislation, the cultural and organisational barriers are extra 
supported.  
The following paragraphs will focus on the latter for public procurement. Which institutional 
barriers are impeding through-life value in public sector projects? Legislation influencing 
public construction/procurement are examined to map the obstacles to overcome/to challenge, 
in order to implement future organising strategies in public construction projects to achieve 
through-life value.  
 
2.1 Changing roles 
First to achieve through-life value all construction participants have to understand/accept their 
new role in the integrated DBFM(O) team. Adapting to these new roles is hard, as change is 
often experienced as complicated, not ensuring better conditions afterwards. Together with 
obsolete legislation not being questioned, this first change is not evident.  
 
2.1.1 Public initiator 
The delivery of projects using conventional procurement normally involves the public sector 
contracting with the private sector to construct an asset, with the public sector providing the 
design and the financing itself. The public initiator is then responsible for operating the asset 
once it is built and can outsource the operational services to the private sector under separate 
contracts.  
In integrated projects the public initiator gets the opportunity to go back to their core business 
being an organiser and regulator. Providing the project brief to the market with tight 
specification of the output requirements for the project detailing them for an extended period 
of time, from availability to handback (Hayen and Immers, 2009). 
A shift from public financing in traditional procurement to private financing-public funding in 
integrated public-private partnerships (PPP) helps the government to make quick and cheap,  
ESA-neutral investments. Unfortunately in Belgium this is too often the only incentive for 
using integrated DBFM(O) teams in public construction projects. No instruments, like market 
scan, public-private comparator (PPC) or public sector comparator used in the Netherlands, 
testing the added value for money using PPP and accordingly DBFM(O), are implemented in 
the project procedure. The private sector with their skills and competencies are not involved 
as decisive factor in the choice between traditional or integrated (Hayen and Immers, 2009). 
 
 2.1.2 Contractor 
In traditional public procurement private contractors have been long involved in providing the 
construction of buildings, while in integrated DBFM(O) projects the private sector is charged 
with, not only the building, but a flow of infrastructure services for a long period of time 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). Numerous sources also suggest that moving from product 
delivery to the provision of integrated bundles of products and services, called servitization, 
requires a significant transformation in the way that firms are organized (Galbraith, 2002). 
Different skills, knowledge and people are needed. A move from price supplier to quality 
supplier is vital. The contractor will have to integrate both forward and backward in the 
construction process, adding his knowledge, skills and experience in all phases. The 
contractor gets the lead in public DBFM(O) projects. 
 
2.1.3 Consultant 
For many years now the Belgian architect has been, become the professional in charge in 
construction projects as a result of the title and profession protection and accordingly the 
creation of a monopoly status for architects in the Belgian market (Architect Act, 1939). 
Meaning that every initiator of a building activity requiring a building permission has to 
involve an architect, which result in this powerful position. Accordingly it is not a surprise 
that the study of Black et al. (2000) states that consultants are less convinced of the integrated 
thought and appear to feel that IPTs are simply a fad. According to the study they are less 
enthusiastic due to fears of loss of control. A change in the architect’s attitude will be 
paramount. 
Trade unions or professional bodies mostly have a conservative and defensive culture that 
inhibits change and encourages maintenance of the status quo (Craft, 1991). Van der Auwera 
(2010) aligns this to the conservative Chamber of Architects and their unwillingness to 
reform. Not only is the Architect act obsolete so is the Chamber of Architects, while they 
could be in perfect position to stimulate innovation in building organisation by supporting 
their architect members. 
 
 2.2 Changing procurement procedures 
Secondly the best suited procurement procedure to select the integrated project team is 
searched for.  
Where in the past only traditional procurement procedures, and more specific open or 
restricted bidding and offerte-aanvraag/appel d’offres (extra procurement procedure used only 
in Belgium) were used by the Belgian public initiator to award contracts, today the EU 
directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC stimulate the member states to use the competitive 
dialogue or the negotiated procedure to find skilled teams for complex and/or exceptional 
projects, where the nature of the works, supplies, or services or the risks and considerable 
uncertainties attaching thereto do not permit prior overall pricing (art 30 1b). These directives 
are transferred into the new Belgian public procurement law of 2006, fully operational since 
July 2013 (PPL2006). 
Since public procurement cannot be grounded on trust-based negotiations and prior work 
experience, these laws are often seen as working against collaborative relationships (Ng et al., 
2002; Naoum, 2003).  
  
2.2.1 Negotiated procedure 
Although the EU gives priority to the use of competitive dialogue for complex contracts 
(art.29), all DBFM(O) projects in Belgium are procured using the negotiated procedure.  
In this negotiated procedure after bidding, the selected participants are invited to debate, 
which results in a best and final offer. After weighing the BAFOs the contract can be awarded 
to the most economically advantageous tender. Unfortunately price again represents at least 
60% of the selection criteria, the other 40% often embodies timing and materials used, both 
price-driven and not the soft parameters like resources and competencies, reputation, 
collaborative ability, earlier experience of the supplier and shared values, Kadefors et al. 
(2007) suggested to use. As mentioned before, Cheung (2003) stated that a focus on price and 
competition offer little incentive for trust and cooperation to emerge , this procedure is proven 
to be unsuitable to deliver through-life value in construction projects. 
Further the negotiated procedure also impedes early supply team involvement since the 
bidding comes before the debate. The potential for innovation a DBFM(O) team could bring 
is already tied down as the brief of the project is clearly defined for the tender documents.    
 
2.2.2 Competitive dialogue 
The new Belgian public procurement legislation of 2006 (PPL2006) together with the royal 
decrees of 2011 provide, through competitive dialogue, possibilities for limited invitation to a 
few trusted bidders, increasing the chances of lasting relationships in which actors can 
establish shared values and win-win attitudes, in addition to the short term perspective of the 
open bid procedures (Eriksson et al., 2008). In this procedure the early involvement of all 
construction participants, with their skills, knowledge and experience in the debate before 
bidding could guarantee achieving through life value.  
Unfortunately although the procedure is ready for use, it is up till today nowhere adopted in 
Belgium. Due to the earlier, but still recent opportunity in the Belgian public procurement law 
to apply the negotiated procedure, this procedure is now becoming embedded. Resulting again 
in a fear of change and lacking knowledge and experience impeding the implementation of 
the competitive dialogue. 
 
2.3 Changing contracts 
Thirdly an adapted contract to be able to deliver through-life value is crucial. 
Although Barlow et al. (1997) accuse the deep-rooted practice of using standard contracts of  
preventing the adoption IPTs since it brings a formality that stifles good relationships, in the 
Netherlands the Directorate-general for public works and water management (Rijkswaterstaat 
RWS) and the Government buildings agency (Rijksgebouwendienst RGD) publishes, uses and 
frequently updates (e.g. after finishing a DBFM(O) project successfully) a standard model 
agreement which is state wide in use. Today even more and more local authorities are 
convinced as well to use this model agreement.  
In a contract people are looking for dividing joint commitment, risks and responsibilities, 
good communication, transparency and trust. Knowing that system-based trust is ranked as 
the most important trust factor among clients and consultants, this indicates that they rely 
strongly on satisfactory contract terms to enhance trust (Wong et al., 2004). At the same time 
according to Lazar (2000) these contracts increase opportunism, since standard contracts are 
too rigid and do not emphasize collaboration and sharing of responsibilities and risks. Instead, 
they focus on the individual parties and dividing their responsibilities, thereby driving a 
distance between them which is negative for dispute resolution. 
Egan stated (1998) that formal, rigid, contractual relations need to be replaced by an 
integrated supply chain system which improves productivity and profits. 
Although we are not restricted by the use of standard contracts in Belgium as the authors 
above mention, the benefits RWS and RGD in the Netherlands experience are worthwhile to 
study since their standard documents are a translation of all knowledge and experience 
gathered in many successful projects. 
 
2.3.1 DBFM(O) contract 
In general in DBFM(O) projects an integrated contract is signed between the public initiator 
and the private consortium (often a special purpose vehicle SPV). All participants in the 
consortium are jointly and severally liable for the project outcome, that is why the separate 
packages in the DBFM(O) contract are subsequently back-to-back contracted to the different 
consultants and sub-contractors in the SPV in order to divide risks and responsibilities.  
In this context the Architect’s act of 1939 is involved again. The protection of the architect’s 
profession established in the act aimed at protecting the public interest (Van Gulijk, 2010). 
Meaning  that in every construction project an architect is involved and subsequently a design 
contract is signed (here back-to-back), a liable professional is in charge. 
The architect protects the public interest through the value of his design and through 
inspecting the execution by the contractor on site, the main tasks of the architect according to 
article 4 Architect’s act (Uytterhoeven, 2010). Having the obligation to control the contractor 
and concurrently sharing in an SPV together with the contractor or being subcontracted as a 
consultant by the SPV allude to a potential conflict of interest. Therefore the Architect’s act 
included a prohibition of collaborative working between architect and contractor in article 6, 
which obliges the architect, as an adviser and representative of the client, to preserve at all 
times his incompatible relationship with the contractor.  
Through this act it is clear that the architect and the contractor can never fully collaborate in 
an SPV and share pains and gains as is aimed for by implementing integrated project teams. 
The SPV managed by the contractor cannot subcontract the design to the architect. A direct 
agreement between public initiator and architect is a possible solution, which floors one of the 
basics of integrated project teams. 
Further in a more recent act, Act Laruelle (2006) some prominent additions were made to the 
Architect’s act. The act offered architects from 2006 on the opportunity to practice their 
profession in a limited company, again without any involvement of incompatible professions 
allowed, i.e. the contractors. This limited company was also of importance concerning 
liability and insurances. While this new law obliges architects as well to insure their 
professional indemnity and ten year liability, what was only a deontological requirement for 
the registration at the Chamber of Architects before, their liability is now limited to what they 
have invested. Meanwhile the architect is still the only construction professional bound by 
law to insure his/her indemnity and liability. What could result in a deep pocket approach 
from other participants, when disputes arise, consequently the architect is often seen as the 
party who (read his insurance) can best bear the risks.  
Sharing and insuring the risks in an integrated project team expects more involvement, 
investment from the client and the contractor, which surely is seen as a barrier. 
 
3. Future challenges 
This article is written as a part of a PhD study. The largest challenge today is collecting the 
empirical data necessary. Future challenges in this study is further examining the barriers 
mentioned above through comparing Belgian tender contracts from selected DBFM(O) cases 
with the standard contracts Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) en Rijksgebouwendienst (RGD) are using 
and adjusting/updating on a frequent basis in the Netherlands. Why is standard contracting not 
used in Belgium? How different is DBFM(O) implemented in Belgium?  
 
4. Conclusions 
To attain best through-life value, a move to fully integrated project teams (IPTs), early supply 
team involvement (werken in ‘bouwteam’), continuous improvement of processes, joint 
commitment and sharing of risks, responsibilities and profits requires a change in roles of the 
participants, procurement procedures applied and contracts negotiated. These changes are 
influenced by three types of barriers impeding through-life value in public DBFM(O) 
projects. The cultural and organisational barriers are supported by the institutional barriers, 
like competitive pressures and government regulations, confirmed by Phua (2006) having the 
largest influence on forming integrated DBFM(O) teams. 
First to achieve through-life value all construction participants have to understand/accept their 
new role in the integrated DBFM(O) team. Secondly the best suited procurement procedure to 
select the integrated project team is searched for and found, the competitive dialogue. In this 
procedure the early involvement of all construction participants, with their skills, knowledge 
and experience in the debate before bidding could guarantee achieving through-life value. 
Stimulating the public initiators to implement this procedure through success stories abroad is 
urgent. And thirdly an adapted contract to be able to deliver through-life value is crucial. With 
the constraint/barrier of the Architect’s act, is it possible to enhance collaboration in the 
future, to achieve fully integrated project teams? 
To end, the vision of Post and Altman (1994), to see opportunities in certain barriers, is worth 
investigating. 
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